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The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) of the European Union has faced problems 
relating to sustainability since its conception. Subsequent reforms have offered some 
limited means of mitigating these problems yet ultimately they have not been 
adequately addressed and continue to cause critical damage to the European fisheries. 
Sound scientific advice has been continuously ignored resulting in catches in excess 
of the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), further compounding depleted stocks and reducing 
the chances of recovery. Despite the latest reform in 2013, European fisheries remain 
in a perilous condition. Brexit creates an opportunity for the UK to develop its own 
fisheries legal framework. A tailor-made system of management specific to the UK 
waters is an enticing prospect for the UK fishing industry. However, the CFP will remain 
in operation for the remaining Member States after the UK has left the Union, therefore 
the UK is likely to encounter substantial difficulty in developing its own personalised 
fisheries management system, such is the entrenched nature of the CFP and other 
relevant international law. 
 
Keywords: Common Fisheries Policy, Brexit, fishery management 
                                                                                                                           
Introduction                                                                                                                          
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Article 38(1) provides 
for the implementation of a fisheries policy. The CFP's aim is to secure the 
'sustainability of fish stocks and the economic competitiveness of the fishing industry.'2 
EU fisheries 'mainly lie in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, the Baltic, the North Sea, the 
                                                 
1 After completing a law degree at Plymouth, I am currently working at Plexus Law in Leeds as a legal 
assistant in the occupational disease team. I intend to undertake the Legal Practice Course in 2019 
and my ambition is to become a practising solicitor. Through researching/writing this article, I have 
developed a keen interest for the law surrounding the marine environment and my ultimate aim is to 
practise in this area in the future. 
2 Khalilian, S., et al., 'Designed for failure: A critique of the Common Fisheries Policy of the European 
Union', (2010) 34(6) Marine Policy 1178-1182 at 1178. 




Mediterranean and the Black Sea'.3 Both capture fisheries and aquaculture are subject 
to the CFP. Reformation occurs approximately every ten years when the Commission 
issues a green paper setting out material to be considered for reform. The current 
version of the CFP is in the 2013 Fisheries Regulation.4 
 
A remarkable trait is the 'lack of political will to reform the CFP and ensure structural 
readjustment of the EU fishing sector.'5 Fisheries contribute 'little to the gross domestic 
product of many Member States. They are not high on the political agenda and this 
has been reflected in their treatment.'6 Unfortunately, money talks and lucrative policy 
areas take precedent over other matters that generate less revenue, regardless of 
their own unique importance. Repeated failures have resulted in 'depleted fish 
populations and billions of euros in lost economic potential.'7 Brexit is an opportunity 
for the UK to start afresh, but difficulties will be encountered because the CFP will 
continue to govern the majority of Europe's fisheries. 
 
1 Origins of the Common Fisheries Policy                                                                           
The CFP started with the 1970 Fisheries Regulation 8  (superseded by the 1976 
Fisheries Regulation9) drafted 'in response to the requirements of the Treaty of Rome 
focussing on ''equal access.'''10 The basic principle of Article 1 was 'equal conditions 
of access for all Community fishermen to each Member State's territorial sea and 
exclusive fishing zone.'11 This condition was met with suspicion from the nations that 
were in negotiations to enter the EEC during that time (Denmark, Ireland, Norway and 
the UK). The fishing interests of these nations were greater than those of the original 
six Member States (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
                                                 
3 Wakefield, J., Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy (2016) at 51. 
4 Council Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Common Fisheries Policy, amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 
and repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and Council Decision 
2004/585/EC, [2013] OJ L354/22 
5 Raakjaer, J., A Fisheries Management System in Crisis:The EU Common Fisheries Policy (2009) 61. 
6 Wakefield, J., 'Sustainability and socio-economic need in the common fisheries policy', (2010) 35(4) 
European Law Review 476-496 at 481. 
7 Carpenter, G., et al., 'Landing the blame: The influence of EU Member States on quota setting', 
(2016) 64 Marine Policy 9-15 at 9. 
8 Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70 of the Council, laying down a common structural policy for the fishing 
industry, [1970] OJ L236/1. 
9 Council Regulation (EEC) No 101/76, laying down a common structural policy for the fishing 
industry, [1976] OJ L20/19. 
10 Raakjaer, Fisheries Management System in Crisis, 51. 
11 Churchill, R., 'The EEC fisheries policy: Towards a revision', (1977) 1(1) Marine Policy 26-36 at 26. 




Netherlands). Collectively, the four nations seeking membership 'caught over three 
times as much fish and would have turned the EEC from a net importer of fish to a net 
exporter', they had a greater contingent of inshore fishermen who 'formed the 
backbone of the local economy [… and] far greater fish-stocks in their coastal waters 
and had practised more effective conservation policies.'12 Arguably, by virtue of the 
equal access requirement, the original six members of the EEC were to secure the 
more advantageous position. Negotiations were tense and 'the failure to secure better 
terms was one of the main reasons why the majority of Norwegians voted against EEC 
membership in their referendum.' 13  The 1972 Accession Treaty contained a 
derogation to the equal access principle permitting Member States to restrict fishing in 
waters under their sovereignty or jurisdiction, situated within a limit of six 
nautical miles, calculated from the base lines of the coastal Member State, to 
vessels which fish traditionally in those waters and which operate from ports in 
that geographical coastal area.14 
 
Theoretically, the transition period afforded isolated communities dependant on fishing 
time to acclimatise to the impending changes mitigating any adverse impacts the new 
regime might have on local fishing communities. Denmark, Ireland and the UK took 
full advantage15 of the derogation. 
 
The 1976 Fisheries Regulation established four main policy objectives: economic 
rationality, food security, social objectives and conservation.  These objectives are 
contradictory and the ineffectiveness of the CFP can largely be attributed to this 
incoherency, 'an obvious mechanism for managing such disparate and conflicting 
objectives would have been to impose strong central control.' 16  Instead, the EU 
controls fishing policy and Member States are responsible for the sector's industrial 
strategy with each Member State pursuing ‘different, and even contradictory, 
objectives.'17 European environmental policy was primarily focused on pollution and 
non-renewable resources18 therefore the possibility of overexploiting the seas was 
                                                 
12 Ibid.27. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Treaty of Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom Article 100 [1972] OJ L73/15 
15 Churchill, 'The EEC fisheries policy, 27. 
16 Wakefield, Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy, 3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Declaration of the Council of the European Communities and of the representatives of Governments 
of the Member States meeting in the Council of 22 November 1973 on the programme of action of the 
European Communities on the environment [1973] OJ C112/01 






The First Revision of the Common Fisheries Policy 
In 1983 the CFP became a full fisheries policy when 
agreement was reached on a conservation component and a TAC [Total 
Allowable Catch] system was adopted for most stocks, allocating the same 
percentages of the TAC to Member States every year – known as ''relative 
stability.''20 
 
It provided that 'the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, shall examine 
the provisions which could follow the derogations in force until 31 December 1982.'21 
The derogation allowed for the restriction of fishing up to 6 nautical miles from the 
baseline of the coastal Member State 'to vessels which fish traditionally in those waters 
and which operate from ports in that geographical coastal area.'22 Attempts to revise 
the initial CFP were initiated before the derogations under Article 100 of the Accession 
Treaty expired. Preferential rights for local fishermen and measures necessary to 
guarantee a fair standard of living for those dependant on fisheries were 
recommended by the Danish Government. 23   The Council decided to postpone 
making a decision until after the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
which established a 'comprehensive set of international law rules dealing with marine 
fisheries.'24 
 
Initial reaction to the 1983 CFP was mainly one of relief that an agreement had been 
reached. 25  This agreement followed the signing of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (CLOS) and the principles of fishing in the EEZ 
'were to form the basis of EU fisheries regulation'.26 After ratification by the EU, the 
EEZ concept became binding27 in EU waters and the Member States' fishing limits 
were extended to 200 nautical miles from their respective coasts. Under the traditional 
                                                 
19 Wakefield, Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy, 55. 
20 Raakjaer, A Fisheries Management System in Crisis, 51. 
21 Treaty Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom Article 103 [1972] OJ L73/15. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Churchill, 'The EEC fisheries policy’, 27. 
24 Tsamenyi, M., and Hanich, Q., 'Fisheries Jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea Convention: Rights 
and Obligations in Maritime Zones under the Sovereignty of Coastal States', (2012) 27(4) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 793-793 at 793. 
25 Churchill, R., 'EEC fisheries: agreement at last', (1983) 7(2) Marine Policy, 74. 
26 Wakefield, J., 'The problem of regulation in EU fisheries', 15(3) Environmental Law Review 191-204 
at 192-193. 
27 Wakefield, Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy, 55. 




rules of international law, the sea was divided into the high seas and the territorial seas 
each with different regulations. Coastal states have an unquestioned right to regulate 
fisheries exploitation in the territorial sea and to 'apply domestic legislation fully to any 
person engaged in such activities. Similarly, the coastal state was free to prohibit 
fishing by foreigners in its territorial sea and thus to monopolize those fishery 
resources.'28 
 
The EEZ concept is covered in Part V of the 1982 Convention, 'largely framed in terms 
of rights and responsibilities and the duty to cooperate.'29 Article 55 provides that 'the 
exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea [which 
is the zone extended to 12 nautical miles from the coast of the Member State]'. The 
coastal State has 'sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources whether living or non-living.'30 Coastal 
states are to have 'due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in 
a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.'31 
 
Both Articles 63 and 64 contain measures enabling the management of the oceans' 
living resources in a way that is compatible with the ocean itself. The policies adopted 
by one State within its EEZ are highly likely to affect the marine environment on a 
broad scale, therefore cooperation is paramount. Where stocks of species are present 
in the EEZ of two or more coastal States, emphasis is placed on voluntary agreement 
to 'ensure the conservation and development of such stocks.'32 This obligation is 
extended to include areas that are 'beyond and adjacent to the zone.'33 Where highly 
migratory species (listed under Annex.1 of UNCLOS) are concerned, States whose 
nationals fish in a region where such species are located 'shall cooperate directly or 
through appropriate international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation 
and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of such species throughout the 
region, both within and beyond the [EEZ].'34  States are to 'cooperate to establish such 
                                                 
28 Oda, S., 'Fisheries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea', (1983) 77(4) The 
American Journal of International Law 739-755 at 739. 
29 Tsamenyi, 'Fisheries Jurisdiction under the Law of the Sea’, 784. 
30 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 Part V – Exclusive Economic Zone Article 
56(1)(a). 
31 Article 56(2). 
32 Article 63(1). 
33 Article 63(2). 
34 Article 64(1). 




an organization and participate in its work'35 if none exist. 
 
UNCLOS is a monument to 'international law-making'36 establishing international rules 
to encourage cooperation between States.37 It has been described as 'the constitution 
for the oceans.'38 However, the Convention has not been without issue; persistent non-
compliance has been a matter of 'serious concern.'39 Fish-stocks are continuously 
over-exploited which is evidence of breaches of obligations under Article 61(2) and 
Articles 117-119 (providing the obligation to conserve living resource of the high seas) 
and Article 194(5) (failure to take necessary measures to protect and preserve 
rare/fragile ecosystems).40 Evidently then, it is not only the CFP that has struggled to 
deal with the prominent global marine environment issues. 
 
The Fully Established Common Fisheries Policy 
The 1983 CFP41 was based on a TAC system for each fish-stock to be set by the 
Council of Ministers (composed of the Fisheries Minister of the 27 Member States42) 
after consideration of the Commission's legislative proposals.43 Theoretically, the TAC 
is to be set according to recommendations made by biologists from the International 
Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES).44 Under the 1983 Fisheries Regulation, 
the TAC of each fish-stock is 'distributed between the Member States in a manner 
which ensures each Member State relative stability of fishing activities for each of the 
stocks considered.'45 Relative stability entailed that 'national quotas for each stock 
would be allocated between Member States in the same proportion as their catches 
of that stock over a certain past reference period.'46 
 
                                                 
35 Article 64(1). 
36 Papanicolopulu, I., 'The Law of the Sea Convention: No Place for Persons?' (2012) 27(4) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 867-874 at 867. 
37 Wakefield, Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy, 29. 
38 Papanicolopulu, 'The Law of the Sea Convention: No Place for Persons?' 867. 
39 Churchill, R., 'The Persisting Problem of Non-compliance with the Law of the Sea Convention: 
Disorder in the Oceans', (2012) 27(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 813-820 at 820 
40 Ibid 815. 
41Council Regulation (EEC) No170/83 establishing a Community system for the conservation and 
management of fishery resources, [1983] OJ L24/1 
42 Raakjaer,  A Fisheries Management System in Crisis, 52. 
43 Dadge, C., 'A critical evaluation of the Common Fisheries Policy and reform proposals', (2012) 24(2) 
Environmental Law and Management 60-74 at 61. 
44 Cunningham, S., 'EEC fisheries management: A critique of Common Fisheries Policy Objectives', 
(1980) 4(3) Marine Policy 229-235 at p.231 
45 1983 Fisheries Regulation Article 4(1). 
46 Churchill, 'The EEC fisheries policy: Towards a revision', 29. 




Alongside the principle of relative stability, the TAC method of setting catch quotas is 
the 'cornerstone in the conservation policy and EU fisheries management.'47 When 
this conservation policy was established, overfishing was 'considered relatively 
unimportant.'48 Initially, it was thought that this system would provide an effective 
method of fisheries management but was recognised as dependant on the TAC of any 
given fish-stock being 'set at the level recommended by fishery scientists and not 
boosted to increase State's quotas.' 49  These reservations turned out to be well-
founded, between 1984 and 1992, 'there was good compliance with scientific advice 
only when proposed changes to TACs were small.'50 
 
Irreconcilable tension between conserving fish-stocks and the 'promotion of fishing 
activity to protect jobs has helped maintain overcapacity and excessive extraction 
rates.'51 Conservation was not a priority for Member States when the 1983 Regulation 
was introduced, they were 'more interested in dividing up fishing entitlements.'52 The 
'significant gap between the levels of TACs agreed in Council and sustainable catches 
indicates the prevalence of short-term concerns over long-term sustainability.' 53 
Perhaps the most reasonable explanation as to why the Council adopts a socio-
economic discourse to justify increasing TACs is that fisheries ministers are 'under 
pressure from domestic fishing sector representatives, who obviously have a short-
term interest in protecting the profitability of their business.'54 Fisheries ministers often 
share common interests with the fishermen and therefore argue that 'fish should not 
come before people'.55 As the domestic fishing industry has a vested interest in TACs 
being set as high as possible, it would be particularly difficult for ministers to persuade 
fishermen to adopt a long-term view. Historically, fishermen have harboured 
scepticism about scientific assessments,56 questioning the advice of expert bodies 
and demonstrating a reluctance to adapt when jobs are at risk. Arguably, the root 
                                                 
47 Raakjaer, A Fisheries Management System in Crisis, 53. 
48 Penas, E., 'The fishery conservation policy of the European Union after 2002: towards long-term 
sustainability', (2007) 64(4) ICES Journal of Marine Science 588-595 at 588. 
49 Churchill, 'EEC fisheries: agreement at last', 74. 
50 Carpenter, 'Landing the blame’, 10. 
51 Wakefield, Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy, 4. 
52 Ibid 55. 
53 Da Rocha, J., et al., 'The Common Fisheries Policy: An enforcement problem', (2012) 36(6) Marine 
Policy 1309-1314 at 1313. 
54 Raakjaer, A Fisheries Management System in Crisis, 78. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid 79. 




cause of this problem is the irrationality of the main objectives of the CFP; by 
prioritising one objective others will be marginalised. The process leads to the 'paradox 
of ministers protecting national interests while attempting to allocate quotas among 
Member States for mutual benefit and to achieve conservation goals.'57 
 
The TAC system has been hindered because, until the 2013 Fisheries Regulation,58 
catch statistics did not include the 'volume of discards and illegal, unreported and 
unregulated catches.'59 Consequently, it appeared from the fish that were landed that 
fewer fish were being taken; fish that were caught accidentally or caught in excess of 
the vessel's quota were simply thrown back dead overboard. 
 
The Tragedy of the Commons 
The 'tragedy of the commons'60 has long been recognised as a problem affecting 
fisheries:61 in an open pasture, each herdsman seeks to maximise his gain, only 
considering the utility of adding another animal to his herd. This utility is comprised of 
both a positive and a negative element: 'Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds 
from the sale of the additional animal, his positive utility is nearly +1.'However, since 
'the effects of overgrazing are shared by all herdsmen the negative utility for any 
particular decision-making herdsmen is only a fraction of -1.'The rational herdsman 
concludes that the sensible course of action is to continue adding animals to his herd. 
All herdsman reach the same conclusion, giving rise to the tragedy ‘...Freedom in a 
commons brings ruin to all.'62 
 
The TAC system exacerbates the situation encouraging fishermen to race to catch fish; 
where species are profitable economically, 'catches usually exceed the quota 
allocated.'63 National governments 'refrain from enforcing strict control on their citizens 
because of the perception that none of the other Member States do.'64 Due to the 
                                                 
57 O'Leary, B.C., et al., 'Fisheries Mismanagement', (2011) 62(12) Marine Pollution Bulletin 2642-2648 
at 2642. 
58 Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013. 
59 Villasante, S., et al., 'Overfishing and the Common Fisheries Policy: (un)successful results from the 
TAC regulation? (2011) 12(1) Fish and Fisheries 34-50 at 36. 
60 Hardin, G., 'The Tragedy of the Commons', (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243-1248. 
61 Van Long, N., and McWhinnie, S., 'The tragedy of the commons in a fishery when relative 
performance matters', (2012) 81 Ecological Economics 140-154 at 140. 
62 Hardin, G., 'The Tragedy of the Commons', (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243-1248 at 1244. 
63 Villasante, 'Overfishing and the Common Fisheries Policy’, 36. 
64 Raakjaer, A Fisheries Management System in Crisis, 54. 




actions of the more militant fishermen, the community at large will ultimately suffer; in 
200765 France and Italy had both overfished their bluefin tuna quotas, resulting in the 
EU's share being exhausted66 and the affected fisheries were closed.67 After the ban 
was lifted in 2008, the Member States who had been denied the opportunity to fulfil 
their quota were granted compensation in the form of additional share of the TAC 
deducted from the quota of France and Italy. Even though the Member States (Cyprus, 
Greece, Malta, Portugal and Spain) were compensated, this incident demonstrates 
that the tragedy of the commons is inherent and that the damage caused by the 
transgressors is dispersed across all sharing the resource.68 Compensation does not 
remedy the situation because it quantifies the damage done in terms of loss of revenue 
for the Member States' fishing industries, whereas the damage done to the fish-stock 
cannot be redressed through compensation. Instead, prohibitive measures are 
required, which in turn cause further loss of revenue for the EU's fishing industry as a 
whole. 
 
2 The Factortame Saga: TACs and National Quotas Subverted? 
The 1983 CFP granted one exception to the equal access principle in the form of the 
exclusive national coastal zone. The Commission proposed that this should be a zone 
consisting of 12 miles from the baseline of the coastal State's territorial sea.69 However, 
the agreement preserved zones of 6 or 12 miles; this was viewed as a 'necessary 
measure of protection and preference for local inshore fishermen.'70 Although mostly 
superseded by the CFP, the exclusive national zone was derived from the 1964 
Fisheries Convention (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK are signatories). 
Under this Convention, the coastal State has 'the exclusive right to fish and exclusive 
jurisdiction in matters of fisheries within the belt of six miles from the baseline of its 
                                                 
65 Council Regulation (EC) No1533/2007 amending Regulations (EC) No 2015/2006 and (EC) No 
41/207, as regards fishing opportunities and associated conditions for certain fish stocks, [2007] OJ 
L337. 
66 Wakefield, Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy, 167. 
67 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1073/2007 establishing a prohibition of fishing for bluefin tuna by 
Community vessels in the Atlantic Ocean, east of longitude 45°W, and the Mediterranean Sea, [2007] 
OJ L245/3 
68 Fahy, E., Overkill! - the euphoric rush to industrialise Ireland's sea fisheries and its unravelling 
sequel (2013) 198. 
69 Churchill, 'The EEC fisheries policy: Towards a revision', 29. 
70 Churchill, 'EEC fisheries: agreement at last', 74. 




territorial sea.'71 The Convention also provides that 'within the belt between 6 and 12 
miles measured from the baseline of the territorial sea, the right to fish shall be 
exercised only by the coastal State and by such other Contracting Parties, the fishing 
vessels of which have habitually fished in that belt between 1 January 1953 and 31 
December 1962.' These measures were retained in the CFP as exceptions to the 
equal access principle,72 yet this does not apply to the EEZ, which is accessible to the 
other Member States. 
 
The Factortame saga's central issue was that 'the British government, concerned that 
many vessels registered under the Merchant Shipping Act 1894 were only nominally 
British, decided to take steps to protect the British fishing quota.'73 The Act (which has 
since been repealed) was passed, mainly to prevent 'quota-hopping' by (mainly 
Spanish) vessels registered in Britain as a means of accessing the British proportion 
of the TAC. 74  Quota-hopping occurs where 'vessels beneficially owned by the 
Nationals of one Member State are re-registered under the flag of another Member 
State and fish for the quotas allocated to the latter Member State.'75 This practice has 
'gradually weakened the British fishing industry.'76 Under s.14, a fishing vessel must 
be British-owned, managed within the UK and any charterer, manager or operator of 
the vessel must be a British citizen domiciled in the UK or must be a company of which 
75% of its shares are owned by British citizens (s.14(7)). Ultimately, the provisions in 
question were deemed incompatible with Community law by the ECJ. In reaching its 
decision, the ECJ observed that Community law grants the Member States 
'competence to determine the conditions for the registration of vessels.'77 Member 
States must act consistently with Community law. 78  The ECJ ruled 79  that the 
conditions attached to fishing vessel registration under s.14(7) were contrary to 
                                                 
71 1964 London Fisheries Convention Article 2 
72 Gwiazda, A., 'The Common Fisheries Policy: Economic Aspects', (1993) 17(4) Marine Policy 251-
255 at 252. 
73 Hanna, J., 'Case comment Community rights all at sea', (1990) 106 Law Quarterly Review 2-8 at 2. 
74 Magliveras, K.D., 'Fishing in troubled waters: the Merchant Shipping Act 1988 and the European 
Community', (1990) 39(4) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 899-914 at 906. 
75 Churchill, R., 'Fisheries: can quota-hopping be stopped?', (1989) 14(6) European Law Review 470-
474 at 470. 
76 Noirfalisse, C., 'The Community System of Fisheries Management and the Factortame Case', 
(1992) 12(1) Yearbook of European Law 325-351 at 325. 
77 Case C-211/89 R v The Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Limited and Others 
[1991] E.C.J at p.3962 para.13. 
78 p.3963 para.14. 
79 pp.3970-3971 para.2. 




Community law and, in particular, contrary to Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome 
(abolishing restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State 
in another Member State). 
 
When the British government attempted to protect the interests of fishing communities 
with the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, it was prevented from doing so on the grounds 
that such a measure was incompatible with Community law. It is demonstrable from 
the Factortame decision that 'a core element of the CFP does not sit easily within the 
general framework of Community law.'80 Relative stability 'was explicitly justified by 
reference to the socio-economic importance of fishing to coastal communities.' 
Distribution of the TAC through national quotas indicates an intention to 'benefit the 
economy of the Member State to which they were allocated, rather than the economies 
of other Member States.'81 Arguably, Factortame undermined the TAC and relative 
stability as Spanish vessels were able to exploit a loophole to the detriment of the 
British fishing industry. 
 
Similarly, when in 2003 a new Regulation82 first brought the Azores within the full ambit 
of the CFP,83 a case was brought against the Council by the Azores84 wherein an 
application for the partial suspension of the Regulation in order to prevent any adverse 
impact on Azorean waters was denied. Counsel for the Azores submitted that the 
contested Regulation would result in fish-stocks being irreversibly depleted causing 
the 'total collapse of the Azorean fishing industry.' 85  The Council ruled that the 
applicant had not substantiated this claim to the requisite legal standard.86 A partial 
suspension of the Contested Regulation was deemed by the Council to be 
disproportionate in the circumstances and would have encroached on the CFP and 
third parties (largely Spanish fishermen) who also fished in the area governed by the 
                                                 
80 Hatcher, A., et al., '''Quota-hopping'' and the foreign ownership of UK fishing vessels', (2002) 26(1) 
Marine Policy 1-11 at 2. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Council Regulation (EC) No 1954/2003 on the management of the fishing effort relating to certain 
Community fishing areas and resources and modifying Regulation (EC) No 2847/93 and repealing 
Regulations (EC) No 685/95 and (EC) No 2027/95, [2003] OJ L289/1 
83 Wakefield, J., 'The plight of the regions in a multi-layered Europe', (2005) 30(3) European Law 
Review 406-419 at 411. 
84 Case T-37/04 R The Autonomous Region of the Azores v Council (Order of the President, 7 July 
2004) [2004] E.C.R. II-2153. 
85 Ibid at p.2219 para.18. 
86 p.2220 para.190. 




Contested Regulation. 87  A reversion to the previous fisheries regime 88  protected 
Azorean waters indirectly through rules limiting the access to foreign vessels. Under 
the Accession Treaty89 for Spain and Portugal, certain derogations were permitted to 
facilitate transitional access regime (as they were in the UK Accession Treaty90). 
However, the regime was scheduled to end on 31 December 2002 and it was observed 
that the provisions restricting access of foreign vessels could not remain in force91 
because discrimination on the grounds of nationality was prohibited under Article 12 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community. In dismissing the application, the 
Council opened 'one of the last artisanal fishing areas within the Community to 
industrial exploitation.'92 The Factortame and Azores cases illustrate that the CFP has 
failed to protect communities dependant on fishing. Because measures designed to 
offer such protection are almost certain to be discriminatory in some way, there has 
been great difficulty in attempting to reconcile them with EU law in a wider sense. 
 
The Common Fisheries Policy 1992-2002 
When the 1992 reform materialised, 'fleet capacity, and overfishing had become 
pressing issues, but reform measures introduced proved ineffective in matching fishing 
effort to available resource.'93 The Commission stated that it was necessary to reduce 
fishing capacity and to minimise socio-economic upheaval with measures sympathetic 
to the geographical concentration of fishing and related activities.94 The Report also 
identified two reasons as to why discards were so prevalent: there is either a legal 
obligation to do so (for example if the catch exceeds the quota) or it is economically 
viable to do so, discards could be eliminated if selective fishing techniques were made 
available.95 The main management tool used throughout the 1990s 'continued to be 
annual single species TACs, which continued frequently to be set at levels above those 
recommended by fisheries scientists.' 96  Evidence of lethargy in the reformation 
                                                 
87 p.2221 para.193. 
88 Council Regulation (EC) No 685/95 on the management of the fishing effort relating to certain 
Community fishing areas and resources, [1995] OJ L71/5. 
89 Treaty of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic [1985] OJ L302/28. 
90 Treaty Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom Article 100 [1972] OJ L73/15. 
91 The Autonomous Region of the Azores v Council p.2202 para.132. 
92 Wakefield, Reforming the Common Fisheries Policy, 118. 
93 Ibid 56. 
94 Report 1991 from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Common 
Fisheries Policy, SEC(91) 2288, 18.12.1998 Executive Summary at iv. 
95 Ibid 20. 
96 Churchill, R., and Owen, D., The EC Common Fisheries Policy (2010) at 15. 




process and the lack of 'political will'97 is apparent in the 1992 Fisheries Regulation; 
which had a minimal impact on the core structure and functions of the CFP. 
 
The Common Fisheries Policy 2002-2013 
A Green Paper98 was published prior to the 2002 Fisheries Regulation,99 at a time of 
crisis for the fishing industry with decisive action required to ensure its survival.100 At 
last it appeared that the gravity of the situation was understood,the Commission 
conceded that many fish-stocks would collapse should current trends continue.101 
Member States' failure to sufficiently enforce measures was 'persistent and possibly 
deliberate.'102 In 1991,103 France was found to have failed to comply with conservation 
measures, in 2005104, France had again failed take action in respect of infringements 
and had not implemented measures required under the 1991 ruling. 
 
The tendency of the Council to set TACs beyond scientific recommendations was 
identified as a consequence of 'management deficiencies.'105 The Commission also 
reported a shortage of competent fisheries scientists who were often too restrained by 
the process of giving advice on TACs and quotas 'to allow time for innovative thought'. 
The Commission observed that the fleet was too large and the criteria used to 
determine fishing capacity (tonnage and engine power) was redundant because 
technological advances meant that 'new vessels exert much more fishing effort than 
old vessels of equivalent tonnage and power.' Capacity reduction programmes were 
undermined106 because the fishing industry had 'been able to circumvent the restraints 
on fishing activity laid down in regulation through an excessive use of new 
technology.’ 107  To counteract over-capacity, Regulations 108  were created to 
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decommission fishing vessels and109 restrict public aid to the fisheries sector. The 
days at sea regulation110 (established to aid cod recovery in the Atlantic) was the first 
control used as a management instrument. It was discovered that reducing fishing 
days does not necessarily reduce fish mortality 'because fishers are free to use the 
available fishing days as they find most profitable.' Because reductions in some areas 
have been compensated by increases in others, 'the days at sea limits implemented 
so far have failed to control overall effort.'111 
 
Increased focus on multi-annual plans guided by the precautionary principle were 
recommended as a means of avoiding 'the postponement of difficult decisions for the 
future and abrupt changes in the volume of TACs from one year to the other.'112 The 
2002 Regulation distinguished between recovery plans 113 for stocks outside safe 
biological limits and management plans114 for stocks within safe biological limits, both 
of which imposed an obligation to adopt long-term strategies.115 The 2002 CFP116 
incorporated the same balancing of aims that has 'always proved problematic';117 
allocating equal importance to sustainability, social aspects and environmental 
protection 'could not be effective.'118 Despite the attempt to elevate the prominence of 
sustainability, TACs adopted in the 2003-2007 period were, on average, set 42-57% 
higher than the recommended level.119 Findings showed that multi-annual plans to 
radically reduce fishing activities would be met with 'fierce opposition, no matter how 
strong the scientific evidence.'120 Scientific advice was not binding and the Council 
had discretion where priority of interests was concerned. 121 Data shows that, on 
average, EU TACs were set 20% above the recommended level between 2001 and 
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2015.122 Proposals for the 2002 reform were more extensive than those of 1992 but 
'the outcome of the reform process fell far short of what was proposed.'123 Methods to 
harmonise the CFP's objectives have persistently eluded the Commission and, 
exasperatingly, its best efforts have been brushed aside by an industry that is entirely 
set in its ways. Unsustainable practices were not reduced and habits entrenched in 
the fishing industry's collective mindset found ways to seep through the CFP's 
reformed framework. 
 
The Common Fisheries Policy 2013 
Through the 2013 reform of the CFP, the Commission intended to 'instil a greater 
sense of responsibility for the resource in appropriators.'124 Quite remarkably, the CFP 
had not yet addressed this issue. The Commission's 2009 Report concluded with 
'masterful understatement' 125  that the objectives agreed to achieve sustainable 
fisheries have not been met overall. Five structural problems were identified: fleet 
overcapacity (too many vessels, not enough fish, imprecise policy objectives, a 
decision-making process that encourages a short-term focus, a framework that does 
not give the industry sufficient responsibility and a lack of political will to ensure 
compliance/poor compliance by the industry. Though the situation looked bleak, the 
Commission maintained that, with whole-scale reform, it could be remedied. 
Objectives include long-term sustainability, application of the precautionary approach, 
implementation of an eco-system based method to fisheries management and 
contribution to the collection of scientific data.126 TACs remain as the CFP's core 
management instrument127 for the purposes of exploiting marine biological resources 
at the maximum sustainable yield128 (MSY). MSY is defined as the 'highest theoretical 
equilibrium yield that can be continuously taken on average from a stock under existing 
average environmental conditions without significantly affecting the reproduction 
process.'129 
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The Commission found that relative stability had given rise to 'a considerable 
discrepancy between the quotas allocated to Member States and the actual needs 
and uses of their fleets.'130 The Commission proposed that relative stability could be 
replaced with the allocation of fishing rights. It is alleged that individual transferable 
quotas (ITQs) will harness fishermen's self-interest 'by effectively rewarding more 
efficient use of resources through the market.' 131 There is a risk that small-scale 
fisheries could be 'easily crowded out of the market.'132 The Commission did suggest 
a separate system for small-scale coastal fleets but this did not materialise.133  It is 
also provided that 'no exit from the fleet supported by public aid shall be permitted 
unless preceded by the withdrawal of the fishing licence and the fishing 
authorisations.'134 Fishing capacity that corresponds to vessels withdrawn with public 
aid shall not be replaced and the EU's fisheries funding instrument provides that 
financial contribution in pursuit of objectives 'shall not result in an increase in fishing 
capacity.'135 The tightening of subsidies under the European Maritime and Fisheries 
Fund (EMFF) justifies 'cautious optimism' and the ability to 'establish national systems 
of transferable fishing concessions has the potential to increase efficiency in the 
fisheries sector.'136 
 
Due to a top-down approach, the fishing industry has been given few incentives to 
behave responsibly.137 Therefore Member States having a direct interest in certain 
measures may submit recommendations for achieving such objectives. The 
Commission is obliged to delay delegation/implementation until the 'expiry of the 
deadline for submission of joint recommendations by the Member States.'138 Regional 
measures have been introduced in order to achieve 'better implementation by more 
coordinated actions at a regional level.' 139  Arguably, the regionalisation provision 
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relieves the central level and provides it with 'the opportunity to escape, at least in part, 
the micro-management trap and focus more on principles.'140 Despite being criticised 
as 'weak'141 Article 28 can be regarded as 'a starting point for increased regional 
governance of fisheries activities within the overall CFP architecture.'142 
 
The 'major achievement'143 of the 2013 Regulation is the ban on discards. In severe 
cases, discards have represented over 60% of the catch.144 The landing obligation145 
is the instrument adopted to facilitate the discard ban. Generally, the ban has been 
hailed as constituting a vast improvement to the CFP, 146  but it is not without 
irregularities that could potentially undermine the policy. For example, the discard ban 
only applies to commercially important species but, in order to provide greater 
protection for biodiversity, 'it would be preferable that all fish and targeted species are 
covered.'147 
 
Remote electronic monitoring (REM) systems are identified as a means of attaining 
complete monitoring of fishing activity. A study on fully documented fisheries (FDFs) 
concluded that REM is 'proving to be an adequate tool.'148 Although, its 'sustained use 
in European fisheries is nevertheless uncertain, both because the applicability of REM 
is more difficult for large fleets of small vessels, and because of the ethical questions 
that the system raises.' 149  However, given the fishing industry's persistent non-
compliance, stricter surveillance is justified. 
 
Introducing the discard ban is seen as 'a driving force for developing more selective 
gears and methods.'150 It follows the shift towards imposing responsibility onto the 
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appropriator as fishermen now have an incentive to become more selective in 
extraction practices to minimise unwanted catch because the landing obligation 
dictates that landed catches will (where applicable) be counted against quota.151 
Logistical problems for purse seiners and bottom trawlers due to limited hold space 
are identified as an obstacle for the landing obligation.152 Nonetheless, the discard ban 
is one of the CFP's most important measures to date and, 'despite some institutional 
inertia, the national efforts and the international coordination have allowed significant 
progress to be made.'153 Recent research gives reason to be optimistic about the 
discard ban;154 in 2017, the Commission reported that the obligation was being widely 
applied to TACs across EU fisheries but also appreciated that the process is ongoing, 
'requiring concerted efforts from industry and administrations. 
 
3 Brexit: The Fisheries Question 
Leaving the EU is set to be a 'defining moment in the constitutional politics of the 
UK.'155 From the perspective of the UK's fishing industry the Factortame outcome was 
a cause for complaint because it produced an outcome that was incoherent, and had 
left unresolved tension between fundamental Community principles. Brexit creates an 
opportunity to reinvent the UK's fishing industry. 
 
In 2017, the UK government announced its plan for a Fisheries Bill that would 'enable 
the UK to control access to its waters and set UK fishing quotas once it has left the 
EU.'156 A profound challenge awaits; achievement would necessarily entail that the UK 
government would succeed where European legislators have failed. The severity of 
the situation has created a greater awareness of the importance of a healthy marine 
environment and the impact of man's activity. For example, documentaries such as 
'The End of the Line' and chef Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall's (pre-2013 Fisheries 
Regulation) campaign to get the EU to ban discards effectively highlighted the 
                                                 
151 2013 Fisheries Regulation Article 15(1) 
152 Maynou, F., et al., 'Fishers' perceptions of the European Union discards ban: Perspective from 
south European Fsiheries', (2018) 89 Marine Policy 147-153 at 151. 
153 Uhlmann, S.S., et al., 'Discarded fish in European waters: General patterns and contrasts', (2014) 
71(5) ICES Journal of Marine Science 1235-1245 at 244. 
154 Catchpole, T., et al., How to deal with the EU landing obligation: Lessons from an English discard 
ban sea trial', (2018) 75(1) ICES Journal of Marine Science 270-278 at 275. 
155 Gordon, M., 'Brexit: a challenge for the constitution, of the constitution?' (2016) 12(3) European 
Constitutional Law Review 409-444 at 409. 
156 The Queen's Speech 21 June 2017. 




destructive practices of the fishing industry.157 The referendum campaign significantly 
raised the profile of fisheries, 'which was widely seen as a policy area where there was 
much to gain and little to lose from leaving the EU'.158 The House of Lords European 
Union Committee (HLEUC) acknowledges that withdrawal from the CFP presents the 
UK with the opportunity to develop a tailor-made fisheries management regime. 
However, there is also recognition that the UK and the EU will part ways just as the 
CFP has started to display signs of improvement due to its recent reform.159 
 
The finer details are virtually impossible to envisage as there remains 'uncertainty as 
to when and how negotiations on the fisheries question will unfold, let alone their likely 
outcomes.'160 Some form of interim measure will be required 'to ensure there is an 
adequate regulatory framework going forward.' 161  Despite the end-result being 
unknown, a number of broad implications that Brexit could have on fisheries 
management in the UK have been identified; control over a greater area of sea, a 
renegotiation of quotas allocated to the UK, power to walk away from negotiations, the 
degree to which exclusion of non-UK vessels would be possible, international 
cooperation on setting quotas and UK influence on management of stocks shared with 
the EU and, a UK fisheries policy/management system. 162 
 
Control Over a Greater Area of Sea 
Individual EEZs of Member States are treated as a collective EU zone in order to 
'harmonise competition between fishers'.163 The 0-6 nautical mile zone is reserved for 
domestic fishing whereas States with historic fishing rights are permitted to fish in the 
6-12 nautical mile zone of some other States. The UK identified Norway and Iceland 
as both having control over fishing in their own EEZs. A seamless assumption of 
control of the EEZ after Brexit is unlikely; the coastal State, in granting other States 
access to its EEZ, is obliged to take into account 'the need to minimize economic 
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dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone'.164 Evidently 
then, control of the EEZ will by no means 'wipe the slate clean.'165 
 
Arguably, the UK government is mistaken in drawing a parallel between Norway and 
Iceland and the UK and the degree to which these States exert control over their 
respective EEZs. Neither are EU Member States, therefore their fisheries do not come 
under the jurisdiction of the CFP and their respective EEZs have never been 
considered part of the EU's waters. Consequently, Norway and Iceland's 
circumstances cannot be said to be wholly analogous to those now faced by the UK. 
Caution is needed in using Iceland's situation as a model for the UK.166 Nevertheless, 
the consensus among witnesses consulted by the House of Lords EU Energy and 
Environment Sub-Committee (HLESC) was that 'upon withdrawing from the EU, the 
UK will assume control of the UK EEZ.'167 
 
Renegotiation of Quotas and Walking Away From Negotiations 
Either the British government or the public body responsible for fisheries management 
will determine the TAC in UK waters post-Brexit.168 Most fish stocks are shared with 
neighbouring States, therefore proper management of North Sea stocks requires 
'some form of co-operative management regime between the EU, the UK and 
Norway.' 169  Uncertainty remains about whether Brexit will grant the UK greater 
bargaining power to renegotiate its allocated catch quota and successful negotiation 
will inevitably require both the UK and the EU to be willing to reach agreement.170 Yet 
there is a reluctance to depart from established practices in the EU due to the risk of 
a 'knock-on effect'.171 Recent improvements to fish-stocks may also make the EU 
extra-resilient to granting concessions to the UK in fear of disturbing the delicate 
situation. 
 
Persuading the EU to rearrange quota allocations is unlikely to succeed because of 
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the 'historic reluctance of Member States to renegotiate the relative stability key.'172 
Professor Churchill concurred, calling it a 'mammoth task'.173 Although the UK has 
some bargaining power at its disposal; for example, catch statistics 'suggest that EU 
vessels have a clear interest in preserving access to the UK EEZ.'174 Some have 
suggested the 'lever' method of negotiating premised on the idea that 'by withholding 
access to fishing in the UK EEZ, the UK can get better quota allocations.'175 But 
adversarial tactics are likely to do more harm than good as they will leave issues 
unresolved thereby generating more confusion in a discussion already rife with 
uncertainty. 
 
Exclusion of Non-UK Vessels 
This issue is likely to be one of the most 'complex and contentious'176 areas faced by 
negotiators. Excluding EU vessels from the EEZ is unfeasible practically speaking 
because it would 'trigger reciprocal exclusion of UK vessels from the EU fishing 
zone.'177 Fishing for Leave argue that it is worth the sacrifice; as UK waters have the 
'lion's share of resources, reciprocal access...is a one way street massively to our [the 
UK's] detriment.'178 However, the EU may prove uncooperative in other areas of the 
Brexit negotiations should the UK prove to be too antagonistic. After Brexit, EU vessels 
with a right of access to the UK EEZ will then become subject to UK-formulated 
regulation.179 Withdrawal from the 1964 London Convention has been identified as a 
means of extinguishing historical fishing rights in UK waters. 180 Whilst the UK is 
entitled to revoke the Convention, doing so could give rise to 'diplomatic consequences 
in bilateral relations over and above those which will be a part of the Brexit 
discussions.'181 Professor Churchill believes that the Convention was subsumed by 
the CFP and therefore the UK would not be bound by the obligation to observe historic 
rights in the 6-12 nautical mile zone.182 In contrast, Lord Gardiner appears to state that 
                                                 
172 Brexit: Fisheries 8th Report of Session 2016-2017, para.137 p.39. 
173 Brexit: Fisheries Written and Oral Evidence, 52. 
174 Brexit: Fisheries 8th Report of Session 2016-2017, para.135 p.39 
175 Ibid. at para.131 p.38 
176 Phillipson, '''A sea of troubles'', 173. 
177 Ibid 170. 
178 Brexit: Fisheries Written and Oral Evidence, 111. 
179 Phillipson, '''A sea of troubles'', 170. 
180 Perraudin, F., 'UK to 'take back control' of waters after exiting fisheries convention', The Guardian, 
2 July 2017. 
181 Brexit: Fisheries Written and Oral Evidence, 15-16. 
182 Ibid 58. 




the Convention will re-emerge after Brexit.183 Yet if the UK did remain bound, the 
Convention contains a clause stipulating that 'after the expiration of a period of twenty 
years from the initial entry into force...any Contracting Party may denounce the 
Convention by giving two years notice in writing to [the UK government].'184 This view 
is also supported by Professor Barnes, who stated that 'there would be no claims to 
historic rights in the UK EEZ which could be sustained going forward' suggesting that 
after Brexit, the Convention may resurface, but nevertheless maintained that the UK 
can 'legitimately withdraw from the Convention.'185 
 
The UK will also have to deal with 'flag-vessels' – 'UK registered vessels mainly 
crewed by UK nationals and landing most of their catches into UK ports but owned by 
non-UK fishing interests.'186 A result of the UK's chosen quota-management approach, 
'resolving this anomaly could prove financially very costly.' 187  Similarly, restricting 
access to the UK's EEZ would not 'automatically apply to quota-hopping vessels.'188 
The practice caused a substantial controversy amongst UK fishermen and the 
Factortame litigation illustrates how the UK was denied the ability to protect its 
allocated quota. Yet quota-hopping is made possible because of the freedom of 
establishment principle and is not attributable to the CFP. Professor Churchill asserts 
that quota-hopping could be stopped if it is excluded from the fishing industry. 189 
Alternatively, the government could 'seek to ensure that domestic quotas deliver 
benefits to the UK, regardless of quota-hopping, by strengthening the 'economic 
link'.'190 A definite plan remains undeveloped, although complete exclusion of foreign 
vessels from the EEZ at the expense of cooperating with Norway and the EU would 
likely be a 'hollow victory'191 because it would likely result in overfishing. 
 
Cooperation with the EU and Other States 
Uncertainty surrounds this area because Brexit terms are not yet set in stone. A 'soft' 
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Brexit is 'more likely to be conducive to the building of wider, informal cooperative 
structures' whereas a 'hard' Brexit will make 'future cooperation much more difficult.'192 
UNCLOS contains provisions to facilitate cooperate between States and the United 
Nations Fishing Agreement193 (UNFSA – which the UK is a party to) was created to 
complement UNCLOS measures on straddling and highly migratory fish-stocks. The 
UK government has expressed a commitment to join the relevant Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations (RFMOs) post-Brexit. 194  Ultimately, the UK's 
geographical location entails that some degree of cooperative management of shared 
fish-stocks is inevitable; the need for such collaboration will be 'amplified by the 
presence of two jurisdictions sharing the same stocks'.195 A trilateral agreement with 
Norway and the EU will probably be established196 to coordinate the setting of TACs, 
allocation of quotas and platform for cooperation post-Brexit. Promisingly, the 
government prioritised sustainability and hopes to avoid a unilateral approach.197   
 
4 A UK Fisheries Policy? 
Brexit creates a 'completely new situation for UK fisheries'198 therefore it is likely that 
the new policy will endure a shaky start. Going forward, it is recommended that positive 
elements of the 2013 Fisheries Regulation should be embedded into the UKFP to 
facilitate the development of a harmonious dynamic between the UK and the EU. The 
Marine Conservation Society argues that MSY must 'remain an integral part of any 
fisheries management in the UK'. 199  The Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) is likely to be responsible for the UK Fisheries Policy (UKFP) 
but has been 'subject to significant cuts in recent years, giving rise to concern that it 
will not be able to manage this considerable task.'200 Accordingly, UKIP has suggested 
the creation of a designated Fisheries Ministry to oversee the task.201 The Norwegian 
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and Icelandic fisheries regimes are cited as 'particularly impressive'.202 Norway places 
great emphasis on 'controlling not only what happens after the vessel has landed but 
also controlling activity at sea.' 203 Yet such stringent enforcement will be hard to 
implement considering that there are only three Royal Navy vessels dedicated to 
inshore fisheries protection. Admiral Lord West described the UK's plan to exert control 
over fishing waters with such paltry resources as 'amazingly complacent.'204 Such 
statistics provide strong evidence that the UKFP will not be adequately enforced due 
to insufficient funds and resources. 
  
Conclusion 
The hallmark of the UK's fisheries post-Brexit is uncertainty. Whilst the outcome 
remains unknown, future governance will require 'a coming together of UK and EU 
management approaches through a shared vision, common strategy and compatible 
– though not necessarily identical – regulatory systems.'205 Considering that fisheries 
are relatively economically insignificant there are 'widespread concerns that fisheries 
will be pushed aside in the negotiations'.206 However, the government affirmed that 
fisheries would not be marginalised.207 History suggests a real danger that fisheries 
will be sidelined and statements such as 'taking back control'208 will be revealed to 
have been political posturing. The government mostly agreed209 with the HLESC 
findings, although the question remains whether this will translate into effective policy 
in a sector which has so often been overlooked. Yet despite the overwhelming 
challenges ahead, the UK has an opportunity to capitalise on the emerging worldwide 
concern for the marine environment and expand on the gradual progress of the 2013 
CFP. Negotiating is only the first stage of developing a UKFP but may prove decisive 
-  a critical time edges nearer for UK fisheries. 
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